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gateway2/Tongsuo-8.4.0/ssl/statem_ntls/ntls_statem_srvr.c
cheney faeec0af4d 编译
2026-07-11 13:40:57 +08:00

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/*
* Copyright 2016-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2023 The Tongsuo Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "ntls_ssl_local.h"
#include "ntls_statem_local.h"
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
/*
* ossl_statem_server_read_transition_ntls() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
* client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
* (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_server_read_transition_ntls(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
break;
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
case TLS_ST_OK:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
/*
* If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
* 1) We didn't request a Certificate
* OR
* 2) If we did request one then
* a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
* AND
* b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
* list if we requested a certificate)
*/
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
/*
* This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
* not going to accept it because we require a client
* cert.
*/
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
/*
* We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
* received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
* will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
* not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
* the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
* set.
*/
if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
* not sent.
*/
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
}
} else {
#endif
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
}
#endif
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
#endif
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
return 1;
}
/*
* Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
int send_certificate_request_ntls(SSL *s)
{
if (
/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
/*
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* a second time:
*/
&& (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
&& (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
* this for SSL 3)
*/
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
&& !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
&& !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_server_write_transition_ntls() works out what handshake state to move
* to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition_ntls(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
/*
* Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
* to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
*/
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_OK:
if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
/* We must be trying to renegotiate */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
if (!tls_setup_handshake_ntls(s)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
} else {
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or SRP */
if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
} else if (send_certificate_request_ntls(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
}
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
if (s->ext.status_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
if (send_certificate_request_ntls(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
}
/*
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the server to the client.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
s->shutdown = 0;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
/* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
} else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
&& (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Calls SSLfatal_ntls() as required */
return tls_finish_handshake_ntls(s, wst, 1, 1);
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* server to the client.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
s->init_num = 0;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* No post work to be done */
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush_ntls(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
if (!statem_flush_ntls(s))
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
}
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
if (statem_flush_ntls(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (statem_flush_ntls(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
if (statem_flush_ntls(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
if (statem_flush_ntls(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
clear_sys_error();
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
* server
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
int ossl_statem_server_construct_message_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
return 0;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
*confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
/* No construction function needed */
*confunc = NULL;
*mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_hello_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
*confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
*confunc = tls_construct_server_done_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
*confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
*confunc = tls_construct_cert_status_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
*confunc = tls_construct_finished_ntls;
*mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
break;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
*confunc = NULL;
*mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
break;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
* calculated as follows:
*
* 2 + # client_version
* 32 + # only valid length for random
* 1 + # length of session_id
* 32 + # maximum size for session_id
* 2 + # length of cipher suites
* 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
* 1 + # length of compression_methods
* 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
* 2 + # length of extensions
* 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
*/
#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
/*
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size_ntls(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return 0;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
#endif
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
}
}
/*
* Process a message that the server has received from the client.
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_process_client_hello_ntls(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
return tls_process_end_of_early_data_ntls(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return tls_process_client_certificate_ntls(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_process_client_key_exchange_ntls(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
return tls_process_cert_verify_ntls(s, pkt);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
return tls_process_next_proto_ntls(s, pkt);
#endif
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec_ntls(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished_ntls(s, pkt);
}
}
/*
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the client
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_post_process_client_hello_ntls(s, wst);
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange_ntls(s, wst);
}
}
/*-
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
* SNI,
* elliptic_curves
* ec_point_formats
* signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
*
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
0x01, /* 1 point format */
0x00, /* uncompressed */
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
/* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
unsigned int type;
PACKET sni, tmppkt;
size_t ext_len;
tmppkt = hello->extensions;
if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
return;
}
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
return;
ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
ext_len);
}
#define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
&& (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
/* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
|| (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
&& (s->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->new_session = 1;
}
clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
if (clienthello == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
*/
clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
if (clienthello->isv2) {
unsigned int mt;
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
|| s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
* the rest right through. Its format is:
* Byte Content
* 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
* 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
* 3-4 version
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
* 7-8 session_id_length
* 9-10 challenge_length
* ... ...
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
|| mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
/*
* Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
* in the first place
*/
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
/* Parse the message and load client random. */
if (clienthello->isv2) {
/*
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
* Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
*/
unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
PACKET challenge;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
ciphersuite_len)
|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
/* No extensions. */
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
/* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
* for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
* sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
*/
challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
challenge_len, challenge_len)
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
} else {
/* Regular ClientHello. */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
|| !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
&clienthello->session_id_len)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* Could be empty. */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
} else {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATUS
if (s->status_param.ssl_status_enable) {
/* record client session_id */
s->status_param.type = SSL_CLIENT_SESSION_ID;
if (s->status_callback(clienthello->session_id,
clienthello->session_id_len,
&s->status_param) == -1) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_STATUS_CALLBACK_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* record client ciphers */
int ciphersuite_size = 2;
s->status_param.type = clienthello->isv2 ? SSL_CLIENT_V2_CIPHER : SSL_CLIENT_CIPHER;
s->status_param.parg = &ciphersuite_size;
if (s->status_callback((unsigned char *)clienthello->ciphersuites.curr,
clienthello->ciphersuites.remaining,
&s->status_param) == -1) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_STATUS_CALLBACK_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
&clienthello->compressions_len)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
extensions = clienthello->extensions;
if (!tls_collect_extensions_ntls(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
&clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
&clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls already been called */
goto err;
}
s->clienthello = clienthello;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
if (clienthello != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int j;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int protverr;
size_t loop;
unsigned long id;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
/* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
/* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
/*
* Support setting ocsp response message in clienthello callback
* function. Parse the ocsp status and set the relevant flags here,
* otherwise the ocsp API may fail in the client_hello_cb function.
* Because in client_hello_cb it is possible to check if the client
* sends a status_request message.
*/
if (!tls_parse_extension_ntls(s, TLSEXT_IDX_status_request,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0))
goto err;
/* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
break;
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
return -1;
case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
default:
SSLfatal_ntls(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
}
/* Set up the client_random */
memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
/* Choose the version */
if (clienthello->isv2) {
if (clienthello->legacy_version == NTLS_VERSION) {
/* do nothing */
} else if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
|| (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
!= (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
/*
* This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
* support it.
*/
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
/* SSLv3/TLS */
s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
}
/*
* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. Version negotiation comes later.
*/
protverr = ssl_choose_server_version_ntls(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
if (protverr) {
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
/* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
}
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
goto err;
}
s->hit = 0;
if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
clienthello->isv2) ||
!bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
/* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
if (scsvs != NULL) {
for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
if (s->renegotiate) {
/* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
goto err;
}
s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
} else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
!ssl_check_version_downgrade_ntls(s)) {
/*
* This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
* a higher version. We should fail if the current version
* is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
* connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
* an insecure downgrade.
*/
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto err;
}
}
}
/*
* We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
* In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
* this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
* ignored.
*/
if (clienthello->isv2 ||
(s->new_session &&
(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
if (i == 1) {
/* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
} else {
/* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
}
}
/*
* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
* ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
*/
if (s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
if (trc_out != NULL)
BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
}
for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
break;
}
if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
/* no compress */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto err;
}
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tls_parse_all_extensions_ntls(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3.server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (!s->hit
&& s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
&& s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
/*
* s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
* backwards compat reasons
*/
int master_key_length;
master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
&& master_key_length > 0) {
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
s->hit = 1;
s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
if (pref_cipher == NULL)
pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
}
}
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto err;
}
/*
* Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit) {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
}
if (!s->hit) {
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
s->clienthello = NULL;
return 1;
err:
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
s->clienthello = NULL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
* Upon failure, returns 0.
*/
static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
{
s->ext.status_expected = 0;
/*
* If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
* called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
* and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
* influence which certificate is sent
*/
if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
&& s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
int ret;
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
/*
* Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
* et al can pick it up.
*/
s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
switch (ret) {
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
s->ext.status_expected = 0;
break;
/* status request response should be sent */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
s->ext.status_expected = 1;
break;
/* something bad happened */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
default:
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
* Upon failure, returns 0.
*/
int tls_handle_alpn_ntls(SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
unsigned char selected_len = 0;
if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
s->s3.alpn_proposed,
(unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
s->s3.npn_seen = 0;
#endif
/* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
|| selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
|| memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
selected_len) != 0) {
/* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
if (!s->hit) {
/*
* This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
* been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
* selected ALPN.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
selected_len);
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
}
}
return 1;
} else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
return 0;
}
/*
* If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
* present.
*/
}
/* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
/* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
}
return 1;
}
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
if (rv == 0) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() was already called */
goto err;
}
if (rv < 0)
return WORK_MORE_A;
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
if (!s->hit) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
cipher =
ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (cipher == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
if (!s->hit) {
if (!tls_choose_sigalg_ntls(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls already called */
goto err;
}
/* check whether we should disable session resumption */
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
s->session->not_resumable =
s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
if (s->session->not_resumable)
/* do not send a session ticket */
s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
}
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSM2DHE)
s->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
| SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/*
* Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
* certificate callbacks etc above.
*/
if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
/*
* Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
* cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
* we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
* we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
*/
if (!tls_handle_alpn_ntls(s)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
wst = WORK_MORE_C;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
err:
return WORK_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_server_hello_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
int compm;
size_t sl, len;
int version;
unsigned char *session_id;
int usetls13 = s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
/*
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
* tls_process_client_hello_ntls()
*/
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
? hrrrandom_ntls : s->s3.server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*-
* There are several cases for the session ID to send
* back in the server hello:
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
* we send back the old session ID.
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
* session ID.
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
* - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
* regardless
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
* to send back.
*/
if (s->session->not_resumable ||
(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
&& !s->hit))
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
if (usetls13) {
sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
} else {
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
session_id = s->session->session_id;
}
if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* set up the compression method */
compm = 0;
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
|| !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!tls_construct_extensions_ntls(s, pkt,
s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
: SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
/* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = NULL;
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
* a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
*/
if (!create_synthetic_message_hash_ntls(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return 0;
}
} else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_server_done_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_server_key_exchange_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
size_t encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
unsigned long type;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t paramlen = 0, paramoffset;
int ret = 0;
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (type & SSL_kSM2DHE) {
if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
if (curve_id == 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
/* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
/* Generate a new key for this curve */
s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key. */
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
&encodedPoint);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
* ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
* point itself
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATUS
/* record curve_id and pubkey */
if (s->status_param.ssl_status_enable) {
s->status_param.type = SSL_SERVER_EXCHANGE_PUBKEY;
if (s->status_callback(WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - encodedlen,
encodedlen, &s->status_param) == -1) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_STATUS_CALLBACK_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
encodedPoint = NULL;
/* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (lu != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
X509 *x509 = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
size_t buflen = 0;
/* get signing cert and pkey */
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey;
x509 = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509;
} else if (type & SSL_kSM2) {
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_SM2_SIGN].privatekey;
x509 = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_SM2_ENC].x509;
} else if (type & SSL_kSM2DHE) {
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_SM2_SIGN].privatekey;
}
if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey,
NULL) <= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "SM2")) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, SM2_DEFAULT_ID,
SM2_DEFAULT_ID_LEN) <= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (type & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kSM2)) {
if (x509 == NULL
|| (buf = x509_to_asn1_ntls(x509, &buflen)) == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs_ntls(s, &tbs,
(buf != NULL)
? (const void *)buf
: (const void *)(s->init_buf->data + paramoffset),
(buf != NULL) ? buflen : paramlen);
if (tbslen == 0) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
OPENSSL_free(buf);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(buf);
if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
|| !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
|| EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
|| sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
OPENSSL_free(tbs);
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(tbs);
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return ret;
}
int tls_construct_certificate_request_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|| !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const uint16_t *psigs;
size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (!construct_ca_names_ntls(s, get_ca_names_ntls(s), pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return 0;
}
s->certreqs_sent++;
s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
return 1;
}
/* process ClientKeyExchange encrypted pre master secret for kRSA or kSM2 */
static int tls_process_cke_pms_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned long alg_k)
{
size_t outlen;
PACKET enc_premaster;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *pkey_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSM2)
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_SM2_ENC].privatekey;
if (pkey == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_ENC_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATUS
/* record encrypted client pms with RSA/SM2 KeyExchange mode */
if (s->status_param.ssl_status_enable) {
s->status_param.type = (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) ? SSL_CLIENT_RSA_EXCHANGE :
SSL_CLIENT_SM2_EXCHANGE;
if (s->status_callback((unsigned char *)enc_premaster.curr,
(size_t)enc_premaster.remaining,
&s->status_param) == -1) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_STATUS_CALLBACK_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
# endif
outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pkey_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
if (pkey_decrypt == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
if (ctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
/*
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
* section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
* RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
* RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
* in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
* to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
* still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING)
<= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
(unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, pkey_decrypt, &outlen,
PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
/*
* This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
* we double check anyway.
*/
if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(pkey_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
/* Also cleanses pkey_decrypt (on success or failure) */
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pkey_decrypt,
SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(pkey_decrypt);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
static int tls_process_cke_sm2dhe_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
const unsigned char *ecparams;
EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* We don't support ECDH client auth */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
} else {
unsigned int i;
const unsigned char *data;
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
/* Get encoded point length */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATUS
/* record client DH pubkey */
if (s->status_param.ssl_status_enable) {
BIGNUM *pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
s->status_param.type = SSL_SERVER_DH_PUBKEY;
s->status_param.parg = pub_key;
if (s->status_callback((unsigned char *)data,
BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
&s->status_param) == -1) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_STATUS_CALLBACK_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
}
if (ssl_derive_ntls(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kSM2)) {
if (!tls_process_cke_pms_ntls(s, pkt, alg_k)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSM2DHE) {
if (!tls_process_cke_sm2dhe_ntls(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
} else {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
/*
* No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
* the handshake_buffer
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
* extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, j;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
X509 *x = NULL;
unsigned long l;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
PACKET spkt;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
/*
* To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
* longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
* TLSv1.3
*/
s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
if (x == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
/*for ECDHE-SM2, certificates are required */
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (alg_k & SSL_kSM2DHE) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
goto err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
} else if (sk_X509_num(sk) < 2) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto err;
} else {
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
if (j == 0)
sk_X509_push(sk, sk_X509_shift(sk));
if (j == 1)
sk_X509_unshift(sk, sk_X509_pop(sk));
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, ssl_x509err2alert_ntls(s->verify_result),
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
}
}
/*
* Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
* we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
* we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
* a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
* session may have already gone into the session cache.
*/
if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
X509_free(s->session->peer);
/* For NTLS server, s->session->peer stores client sign cert */
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
/* For NTLS server, s->session->peer_chain stores client encryption cert and extra chain certs */
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
sk = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
int tls_construct_server_certificate_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
CERT_PKEY *a_cpk = s->s3.tmp.sign_cert;
CERT_PKEY *k_cpk = s->s3.tmp.enc_cert;
if (a_cpk == NULL || k_cpk == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain_ntls(s, pkt, a_cpk, k_cpk)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
unsigned char *tick_nonce)
{
/*
* Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
* unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
* In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
* timeout.
*/
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
s->hit ? 0 : (uint32_t)s->session->timeout)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
unsigned char *tick_nonce)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
size_t hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
int iv_len, ok = 0;
size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/*
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (senc == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
*/
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
if (sess == NULL) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
/* shouldn't ever happen */
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
/*
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
#else
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
#endif
{
int ret = 0;
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
#endif
if (ret == 0) {
/* Put timeout and length */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
return 1;
}
if (ret < 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
} else {
EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
s->ctx->propq);
if (cipher == NULL) {
/* Error is already recorded */
SSLfatal_alert_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
if (iv_len < 0
|| RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
|| !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
|| !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
"SHA256")) {
EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
}
if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
/* Output key name */
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
/* output IV */
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
&encdata1)
/* Encrypt session data */
|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
|| encdata1 != encdata2
|| !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
|| encdata1 + len != encdata2
|| len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
|| !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
macendoffset - macoffset)
|| !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
|| !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
|| hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
|| macdata1 != macdata2) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
return ok;
}
int tls_construct_new_session_ticket_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
union {
unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
uint32_t age_add;
} age_add_u;
age_add_u.age_add = 0;
if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
tick_nonce)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}
/*
* In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
* create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
*/
int tls_construct_cert_status_body_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_cert_status_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body_ntls(s, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* tls_process_next_proto_ntls reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET next_proto, padding;
size_t next_proto_len;
/*-
* The payload looks like:
* uint8 proto_len;
* uint8 proto[proto_len];
* uint8 padding_len;
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
s->ext.npn_len = 0;
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
}
#endif
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
* a record boundary.
*/
if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
/* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
}
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