/* * Copyright 2016-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2023 The Tongsuo Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "ntls_ssl_local.h" #include "ntls_statem_local.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/tlsgroups.h" static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt); /* * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? * * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) { /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) return 0; return 1; } /* * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? * * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) { return 1; } /* * ossl_statem_client_read_transition_ntls() encapsulates the logic for the allowed * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error * (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition_ntls(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ske_expected; /* * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. */ switch (st->hand_state) { default: break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: /* * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a * HelloRetryRequest. */ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } } else { if (s->version >= NTLS_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick != NULL && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if * the server is resuming. */ s->hit = 1; st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; return 1; } } else { ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST && cert_req_allowed(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; return 1; } } } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: /* * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if * |ext.status_expected| is set */ if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; return 1; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } goto err; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } goto err; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_OK: if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; return 1; } break; } err: SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } /* * ossl_statem_client_write_transition_ntls() works out what handshake state to * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition_ntls(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; /* * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until * later */ switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; case TLS_ST_OK: if (!s->renegotiate) { /* * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have * received a message from the server. Better read it. */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } /* Renegotiation */ /* fall thru */ case TLS_ST_BEFORE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { /* * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't * actually selected a version yet. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what * we will be sent */ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: /* * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one * because we did early data. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: /* * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is * sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. */ if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; } if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; } else { #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #else if (s->s3.npn_seen) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #endif } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: /* * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more * convenient time. */ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { if (!tls_setup_handshake_ntls(s)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } } /* * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from * the client to the server. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* No pre work to be done */ break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: s->shutdown = 0; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: break; case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: /* * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. */ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: return tls_finish_handshake_ntls(s, wst, 0, 1); case TLS_ST_OK: /* Calls SSLfatal_ntls() as required */ return tls_finish_handshake_ntls(s, wst, 1, 1); } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * client to the server. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; s->init_num = 0; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* No post work to be done */ break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING && s->max_early_data > 0) { /* * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ } else if (!statem_flush_ntls(s)) { return WORK_MORE_A; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: /* * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work_ntls(s) == 0) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) break; if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING && s->max_early_data > 0) { /* * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. */ if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) return WORK_ERROR; break; } s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) s->session->compress_meth = 0; else s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: if (statem_flush_ntls(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_B; break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: if (statem_flush_ntls(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the * client * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); return 0; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec_ntls; *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello_ntls; *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; break; case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data_ntls; *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; break; case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: *confunc = NULL; *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate_ntls; *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange_ntls; *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify_ntls; *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; break; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto_ntls; *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; break; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: *confunc = tls_construct_finished_ntls; *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; break; } return 1; } /* * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size_ntls(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ return 0; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: /* * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs */ return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12; case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; } } /* * Process a message that the client has received from the server. */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return tls_process_server_hello_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return tls_process_server_certificate_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: return tls_process_cert_status_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_process_key_exchange_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_process_certificate_request_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: return tls_process_server_done_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: return tls_process_change_cipher_spec_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: return tls_process_new_session_ticket_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished_ntls(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: return tls_process_hello_req_ntls(s, pkt); } } /* * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message * from the server */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { default: /* Shouldn't happen */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: return tls_post_process_server_certificate_ntls(s, wst); case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_prepare_client_certificate_ntls(s, wst); } } int tls_construct_client_hello_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { unsigned char *p; size_t sess_id_len; int i, protverr; SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; unsigned char *session_id; /* Work out what SSL/TLS version to use */ protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version_ntls(s); if (protverr != 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, protverr); return 0; } if (sess == NULL || !ssl_version_supported_ntls(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return 0; } } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p = s->s3.client_random; i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random), DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /*- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can * choke if we initially report a higher version then * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports * 1.0. * * Possible scenario with previous logic: * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret * containing version 1.0. * * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. * * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Session ID */ session_id = s->session->session_id; if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; session_id = s->tmp_session_id; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len, 0) <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } else { sess_id_len = 0; } } else { assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); } } if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, sess_id_len)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Ciphers supported */ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return 0; } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* COMPRESSION */ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Add the NULL method */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* TLS extensions */ if (!tls_construct_extensions_ntls(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; } static int set_client_ciphersuite_ntls(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); if (c == NULL) { /* unknown cipher */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); return 0; } /* * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); return 0; } sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); if (i < 0) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); return 0; } /* * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is * set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->session->cipher != NULL) s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { /* * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same * ciphersuite. */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); return 0; } s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c; return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET session_id, extpkt; size_t session_id_len; const unsigned char *cipherchars; int hrr = 0; unsigned int compression; unsigned int sversion; unsigned int context; RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* load the server random */ if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE && memcmp(hrrrandom_ntls, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; hrr = 1; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } } else { if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } } /* Get the session-id. */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* TLS extensions */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto err; } if (!hrr) { if (!tls_collect_extensions_ntls(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, &extensions, NULL, 1)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } if (!ssl_choose_client_version_ntls(s, sversion, extensions)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } } if (hrr) { if (compression != 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, session_id_len) != 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); goto err; } } if (hrr) { if (!set_client_ciphersuite_ntls(s, cipherchars)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); } /* * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions * are appropriate for this version. */ context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; if (!tls_validate_all_contexts_ntls(s, context, extensions)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); goto err; } s->hit = 0; /* * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake * message to see if the server wants to resume. */ if (s->version >= NTLS_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; /* * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for * backwards compat reasons */ int master_key_length; master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) && master_key_length > 0) { s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); } else { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, session_id_len) == 0) s->hit = 1; if (s->hit) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { /* actually a client application bug */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto err; } } else { /* * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. */ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } } s->session->ssl_version = s->version; /* * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be * used for resumption. */ s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; /* session_id_len could be 0 */ if (session_id_len > 0) memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), session_id_len); } /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed * version. */ s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version; s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version; if (!set_client_ciphersuite_ntls(s, cipherchars)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } if (compression != 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto err; } /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto err; } if (!tls_parse_all_extensions_ntls(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } /* * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise * we're done with this message */ OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *extpkt) { RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; /* * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and * should not be used. */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; if (!tls_collect_extensions_ntls(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, &extensions, NULL, 1) || !tls_parse_all_extensions_ntls(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } OPENSSL_free(extensions); extensions = NULL; if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) { /* * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next * ClientHello will not change */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); goto err; } /* * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. */ if (!create_synthetic_message_hash_ntls(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } /* * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now * for HRR messages. */ if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; err: OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; X509 *x = NULL; const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; unsigned int context = 0; if ((s->session->peer_chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (context != 0 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } certstart = certbytes; x = X509_new_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq); if (x == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len) == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_push(s->session->peer_chain, x)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2 { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int n = sk_X509_num(s->session->peer_chain) - 1; x = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 0); pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey != NULL && EVP_PKEY_is_sm2(pkey)) { if (!EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } while (n >= 0) { X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, n); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id; sm2_id = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (sm2_id == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(sm2_id, (const unsigned char *)CERTVRIFY_SM2_ID, CERTVRIFY_SM2_ID_LEN)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(sm2_id); goto err; } X509_set0_sm2_id(cert, sm2_id); n--; } } } # endif return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; err: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); s->session->peer_chain = NULL; return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type. * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result. * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry. */ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_server_certificate_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { X509 *x = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = s->session->peer_chain; const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; size_t certidx; int i, j; if (s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if (sk_X509_num(sk) >= 2) { for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { if (j == 0) sk_X509_push(sk, sk_X509_shift(sk)); if (j == 1) sk_X509_unshift(sk, sk_X509_pop(sk)); i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if (i > 0 && s->rwstate == SSL_RETRY_VERIFY) { return WORK_MORE_A; } /* * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was * reverted because at least one application *only* set * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. */ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, ssl_x509err2alert_ntls(s->verify_result), SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); return WORK_ERROR; } } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c */ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); return WORK_ERROR; } if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); return WORK_ERROR; } /* * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate * type. */ if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); return WORK_ERROR; } } else { if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, ssl_x509err2alert_ntls(s->verify_result), SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); return WORK_ERROR; } } X509_free(s->session->peer); X509_up_ref(x); s->session->peer = x; s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } static int tls_process_ske_sm2dhe_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET encoded_pt; unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sm2)) == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.peer_tmp, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); return 0; } /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */ s->session->kex_group = curve_id; return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { long alg_k; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; PACKET save_param_start, signature; unsigned char *buf = NULL; size_t buflen; alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; save_param_start = *pkt; EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp); s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL; if (alg_k & SSL_kSM2DHE) { if (!tls_process_ske_sm2dhe_ntls(s, pkt)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls already called */ goto err; } } /* get peer signing pkey */ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { PACKET params; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *tbs; size_t tbslen; X509 *x509; int rv; if (alg_k & SSL_kSM2DHE) { /* * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference * equals the length of the parameters. */ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kSM2 | SSL_kRSA)) { /* get peer's encryption cert */ x509 = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 1); if (x509 == NULL || (buf = x509_to_asn1_ntls(x509, &buflen)) == NULL || !PACKET_buf_init(¶ms, buf, buflen)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx, md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, pkey, NULL) <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "SM2")) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, SM2_DEFAULT_ID, SM2_DEFAULT_ID_LEN) <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } } tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs_ntls(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); if (tbslen == 0) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } OPENSSL_free(buf); buf = NULL; rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); OPENSSL_free(tbs); if (rv <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); md_ctx = NULL; } else { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); goto err; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: OPENSSL_free(buf); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { size_t i; /* Clear certificate validity flags */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; { PACKET ctypes; /* get the certificate types */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { PACKET sigalgs; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. */ if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (!parse_ca_names_ntls(s, pkt)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { unsigned int ticklen; unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; unsigned int sess_len; RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; PACKET nonce; EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL; PACKET_null_init(&nonce); if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never * be 0 here in that instance */ if (ticklen == 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; /* * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session * cache. */ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { SSL_SESSION *new_sess; /* * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new * one */ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) { /* * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); } SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = new_sess; } s->session->time = time(NULL); ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session); OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); s->session->ext.tick = NULL; s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the * ticket. */ sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq); if (sha256 == NULL) { /* Error is already recorded */ SSLfatal_alert_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t */ if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, s->session->session_id, &sess_len, sha256, NULL)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } EVP_MD_free(sha256); sha256 = NULL; s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; s->session->not_resumable = 0; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: EVP_MD_free(sha256); OPENSSL_free(exts); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure */ int tls_process_cert_status_body_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { size_t resplen; unsigned int type; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { if (!tls_process_cert_status_body_ntls(s, pkt)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; } /* * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 * on failure. */ int tls_process_initial_server_flight_ntls(SSL *s) { /* * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from * the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm_ntls(s)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return 0; } /* * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise */ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); if (ret == 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); return 0; } if (ret < 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE); return 0; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return 0; } } #endif return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { /* should contain no data */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight_ntls(s)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } /* construct encrypted pre master secret for kRSA or kSM2 */ static int tls_construct_cke_pms_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned long alg_k) { unsigned char *encbytes1, *encbytes2; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; size_t enclen; unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; X509 *x509; /* * for client side, s->session->peer == s->session->peer_chain[0] is * the server signing certificate. * * s->session->peer_chain[1] is the server encryption certificate */ if (s->session->peer_chain == NULL || (x509 = sk_X509_value(s->session->peer_chain, 1)) == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x509); if (((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) || ((alg_k & SSL_kSM2) && !EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "SM2"))) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, pmslen - 2, 0) <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq); if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, enclen, &encbytes1) || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encbytes1, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, enclen, &encbytes2) || encbytes1 != encbytes2) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encbytes1, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } s->s3.tmp.pms = pms; s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen; return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return 0; } static int tls_construct_cke_sm2dhe_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; int ret = 0; int curve_id; skey = s->s3.peer_tmp; if (skey == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey); if (ckey == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (ssl_derive_ntls(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } /* Generate encoding of client key */ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey, &encodedPoint); if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return ret; } int tls_construct_client_key_exchange_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { unsigned long alg_k; alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kSM2)) { if (!tls_construct_cke_pms_ntls(s, pkt, alg_k)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kSM2DHE)) { if (!tls_construct_cke_sm2dhe_ntls(s, pkt)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ goto err; } } else { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen); s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL; s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0; return 0; } int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work_ntls(SSL *s) { unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; pms = s->s3.tmp.pms; pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen; if (pms == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ pms = NULL; pmslen = 0; goto err; } pms = NULL; pmslen = 0; return 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL; s->s3.tmp.pmslen = 0; return 0; } /* * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate_ntls(SSL *s) { /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ if (!tls_choose_sigalg_ntls(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL) return 0; /* * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. */ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) return 0; return 1; } WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate_ntls(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { X509 *x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int i; if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ if (s->cert->cert_cb) { i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_A; } if (i == 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); return WORK_ERROR; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } if (ssl3_check_client_certificate_ntls(s)) { if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ wst = WORK_MORE_B; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { /* * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; * return(-1); We then get retied later */ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb_ntls(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_B; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) i = 0; } else if (i == 1) { i = 0; ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate_ntls(s)) i = 0; if (i == 0) { s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } } if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* Shouldn't ever get here */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; } int tls_construct_client_certificate_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain_ntls(s, pkt, (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->s3.tmp.sign_cert, (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->s3.tmp.enc_cert)) { /* SSLfatal_ntls() already called */ return 0; } return 1; } int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm_ntls(SSL *s) { const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; size_t idx; long alg_k, alg_a; alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* we don't have a certificate */ if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) return 1; /* This is the passed certificate */ clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx); /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); return 0; } if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) return 1; SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); return 0; } if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); return 0; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int tls_construct_next_proto_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { size_t len, padding_len; unsigned char *padding = NULL; len = s->ext.npn_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } memset(padding, 0, padding_len); return 1; } #endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req_ntls(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { /* should contain no data */ SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } /* * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. */ SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } int ssl_do_client_cert_cb_ntls(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { i = tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s, px509, ppkey); if (i != 0) return i; } #endif if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); return i; } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) { int i; size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); return 0; } if (sk == NULL) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 # error Max cipher length too short # endif /* * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we * use TLS v1.2 */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; else #endif /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ maxlen = 0xfffe; if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) maxlen -= 2; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) maxlen -= 2; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) continue; if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ if (!maxverok) { if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver) maxverok = 1; } totlen += len; } if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { const char *maxvertext = !maxverok ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version" : NULL; SSLfatal_data_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, maxvertext); return 0; } if (totlen != 0) { if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } return 1; } int tls_construct_end_of_early_data_ntls(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { SSLfatal_ntls(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; return 1; }